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1. Introduction 
The necessity of exploiting all available sources of energy all over the 
world also makes the increased implementation of the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy (quite) indispensable. In future not only the industrialized 
countries but also the developing countries will have to make use of nuclear 
energy increasingly. These understandable efforts on the part of the countries 
of the Third World to have a share in utilizing nuclear energy must however 
draw a response from the industrialized countries in such a way that an 
institutional framewerk be created which will serve both the aim of non-
proliferation and also an assured energy supply. In the past, also cooperation 
between industrialized countries within the framewerk of institutional 
models has proved successful. 
This study intends to investigate institutional models which, if applied 
in the nuclear fuel cycle, could do justice particularly to these two 
aspects. The following comments reflect the authors' opinion and represent 
a frozen picture of the position at the end of 1980 which was obtained 
in various discussions with experts on anational and international level. 
If one considers the historical development of these models then there 
were initially intensive efforts in the 1960s to prevent the further pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons by fixing the status quo in the field of 
nuclear weapons. According to Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) states should aim at reducing their weapons potential. 
An appropriate path towards this objective for the non-nuclear weapons 
states was thought at that time to be that they should refrain from 
constructing atomic weapons, but on the other hand that they would be 
unimpeded in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, indeed 
that they would be supported by the nuclear weapons states in the peaceful 
application of nuclear technology. This carefully balanced compromise 
was reflected in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. This Treaty was 
ratified by more than one hundred nations in the following years and was 
held to be a consolidation of a situation regarded as menacing in many 
parts of the world~ These problems took a new turn with the detonation 
of the Indian nuclear explosive device in May 1974. In particular Canada, 
Australia and the United States took this event as an occasion to reconsider 
the consensus achieved within the NPT. The result was the intention of 
more strictly delimiting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly 
in the field of the so-called sensitive activities, such as enrichment, 
reprocessing and the utilization of high-enriched uranium. 
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The new phase in non-proliferation policy triggered by this development 
led, via a large number of suggestions and measures, to the initiation 
of the International Conference on Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). 
This conference, terminated at the beginning of 1980, came to the result 
that there are effective measures for containing proliferation without 
impairing the development of nuclear technology for energy supply. The 
central conclusion from INFCE of not merely regarding proliferation as 
an isolated technical problern but of including it in a country's political 
environment, led to the consideration of countermeasures in order to reduce 
motivation for proliferation by guarantees in the field of assurance of 
supply. These dual aspects in nuclear energy - assurance of supply and 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons- are not new. Elements of assurance 
of supply and aspects of an unrestricted exchange of technologies and 
materials for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, tagether with effective 
safeguards for nuclear material, were already taken into consideration 
in the EURATOM Treaty and indirectly also in the NPT. However, the significance 
attributed by INFCE to coupling non-proliferation and assurance of supply 
is indeed remarkable and was manifested in a special working group for 
assurance of supply. The INFCE consultations were terminated in February 
1980 and found a continuation in the Committee on Assurance of Supply 
(CAS) at the IAEA, which has the task of working out solutions capable 
of finding a consensus for basic questions of international nuclear relations 
by cooperation between all interested nations: 
on one extreme a group of developing countries outside the NPT: 
on the Indian subcontinent India and Pakistan, in South America 
Argentina and Brazil; and also some signatory states to the NPT 
such as Yugoslavia, the Philippines and Egypt, 
on the other extreme a group of western nations (Austria, Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Finland), 
and in the middle the USA, Belgium, Switzerland, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Spain, France, Italy and Japan. 
Within each group finer differences of opinion also exist. 
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From among the many conceivable possibilities of improving assurance of 
supply with a simultaneaus reduction in the danger of proliferation, 
institutional mechanisms in the form of international cooperation were 
regarded by the INFCE as suitable. These considerations were based upon 
the idea that credible guarantees for the front and back end services 
were of particular significance for the growing number of nations who 
felt compelled to use nuclear energy to cover their energy requirements. 
This is supported by the fact that the technological infrastructure of 
these nations can hardly meet demands when crossing the threshold to the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this way an institutionalization of 
multinational cooperation can combine the interest of the individual nations 
in an assured supply with control of proliferation. 
Several features of such institutional mechanisms for international co-
operation will be sketched in this study and investigated with respect 
to their value for preventing proliferation as well as their quality con-
cerning assurance of supply. The models presented for discussion in this 
context are 
International Emergency Agreements 
International Nuclear Fuel Bank (INFB) 
Regional Fuel Cycle Centre (RFCC) 
International Spent Fuel Management (ISFM) 
International Plutonium Storage System (IPS). 
Thesemodels were selected because they play a special role in the post-INFCE 
phase and have also already been discussed and evaluated in part in an inter-
national context, particularly at the IAEA. It can be presumed that in future 
these areas will also be priorities in CAS debates. 
For reasons of clarity and due to the extensive material, the study is 
presented in three parts. The first part is a summarizing representation 
and break-down of all the work. The second part describes the results 
of investigations into emergency supply mechanisms at the front end of 
the fuel cycle (International Emergency Agreements and INFB), and the 
third part presents the Regional Fuel Cycle Centre (RFCC) as well as models 
for the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle (ISFM and IPS). 
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2. S u m m a r e s 
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2.1 Front End 
2.1.1 International Emergency Agreements 
This study is concerned with mechanisms for intergovernmental planning 
in the international uranium market. Particular aspects of a possible 
supply system are presented in the form of an emergency network in the 
case of failure of delivery in the uranium supply sector. The primary 
idea of a uranium network is based (in the first instance) on the perception 
that on the one hand nuclear energy plays a significant role in world 
energy supply but on the other hand only a few nations have sufficient 
uranium deposits at their disposal. Those nations operating nuclear energy 
who do not have their own uranium supplies are therefore justifiably interested 
in assuring their uranium supply in the case of emergency. On the other 
hand, it is in the interest of the international community to prevent 
the further proliferation of nuclear weapons with the aid of generally 
accepted NP principles. We are therefore concerned with the realization 
of institutional possibilities with respect to cooperation which can increase 
confidence, at the sametime affering an effective control of non-proliferation, 
and make a considerable contribution to assuring the supply of participants 
as determined at that time by CAS and demanded in the INFCE. 
At the front end interruptions in the production of natural uranium, con-
version, enrichment and in fuel element fabrication, as well as in the 
necessary transportation between the individual stages, can occur if uranium 
is no langer available in sufficient quantities for various reasons. The 
reasons for failure of the uranium supply can be of a technical, political 
or commercial nature. They can however also be brought about by natural 
catastrophes. Furthermore, technical deficiencies, strikes, a sudden change 
in the uranium exporting or importing countries' policy, a tightening 
of the expert or investment policy of the supplier countries can also 
lead to interruptions in supply. 
In the Appendix, this part of the study contains a comparative investigation 
11 Joint Approaches to Multilateral Agreements Between Producer and Consumer 
Nations in the Field of International Raw-Material Lawsn. 
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The study is divided into the chapters "Assurance of Supply within the 
Framewerk of achanging World Trade System" (description of the model, 
structural questions concerning an emergency agreement, determination 
of function and stocks, the initiators• political objectives), "Network 
or Sharing System (Agreement)", "Individual Elements of an IEA Model", 
"Details of a Network", (1) "Elements of an Agreement between the Holders 
of the Uranium Industry", (2) "Elements of an Intergovernmental Arrangement 
Concerning a Network Agreement". The elements of a uranium network could 
comprise the following areas: 
uranium emergency pool, 
emergency supply trigger with an institutional structure 
for the decision-making mechanism, 
conditions for participation and accession, as well as 
budgeting. 
The basic differences between the IEA model and a network are first of 
all elucidated. The private (or governmental) holders of the uranium industry 
are envisaged as contracting parties in a network, whereas the IEA model 
presumes an agreement between the nations involved under international 
1 aw. 
A further difference is that the network can hand over implementation 
of the agreement to the uranium industry to a large extent, whereas the 
IEA model involves governmental authorities to a higher degree. 
This difference is of significance for storage. In the case of nat~onal 
stores considerably higher costs would result than in storage by private 
industry since the latter operates these stores anyway. 
In centrast to this a significant disadvantage of a network would be that 
the civil agreements on which it is based would be allocated to systems 
of national legal order which, for their parts, would be at the disposal 
of the participating states. 
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In its classification, the study prefers the non-binding, institutionally 
more flexible network model. However, it also draws attention to the fact 
that a too laxly conceived model can not be regarded as desirable. 
The starting point for the whole idea of an emergency arrangement has 
to be the consideration that in case of emergency sufficient assurance 
is guaranteed to the needy party. 
In conclusion, the study suggests that a network should be created by 
a civil agreement between the holders of the uranium industry. Its functioning 
should be ensured by an agreement under international law between the nations 
involved. 
Regardless of the advantages of a network design, the choice between a 
network or the IEA model is however in the last analysis based on. politically 
determined criteria which are also influenced by the course of the inter-
national discussion. 
2.1.2 International Nuclear Fuel Bank (INFB) 
The concept of an INFB is investigated in a general and an individual 
valuation according to the main problern areas (1) proliferation inhibition, 
(2) political independence, (3) assurance of supply, (4) assurance of 
planning, (5) economic efficiency, (6) technology transfer, (7) health, 
safety and environment, (8) political and social acceptance for the hast 
country, (9) capability to sanctions and (10) regulative relevance. In 
describing the model, details of the internal structure are given (including 
aspects of financing, liability and staff), the powers of an INFB as well 
as the member states' rights and Obligations. In addition there are also 
considerations about the order of magnitude of an INFB, store sites, powers 
of the international operating organization, supply and final storage 
as well as release of nuclear material. Finally, supervision, settlement 
of disputes, withdrawal, and sanctions aredealt with, as well as special 
problems such as storage, EURATOM membership, bilateral relations and 
the particular aspects of the nuclear weapons states. 
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The major priorities are the criteria of proliferation inhibition and 
assurance of supply. A balanced design which would adjust the problems 
both of proliferation inhibition and assurance of supply is not yet in 
sight. Since the discussion is still open, no clear evaluation can be 
made from the point of view of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Membership should be open to all recipient and supplier countries, that 
is to say also to those nations who do not have any uranium at their disposal. 
Particular emphasis will be placed on nuclear materials safeguards and 
physical protection of the facility at the bank site. In this connection, 
the question of obstacles to membership resulting from the construction 
or acquisition of sensitive facilities as well as consent to restrictions 
on the utilization of nuclear material is controversial. If the prerequisites 
for membership were tobe applied in such a way that the Federal Republic 
of Germany could become a member under present boundary conditions (NPT 
membership, IAEA safeguards), that is to say no renunciation of the 
construction or acquisition of sensitive facilities and no utilization 
restrictions were to be required, then the bank could provide long-term 
advantages, since it cannot be ruled out that the market which can be 
supplied at the moment could in future be restricted and unbalanced by 
rising demand. 
The economic organization of an INFB would largely depend on the question 
of the extent to which the bank•s administrative procedures can be kept 
free of political influences. Since an INFB should basically also be acces-
sible to states who cannot contribute any material then a structurally 
determined advantage would result in comparison to a network. However, 
the participation of private parties has not yet been settled and this 
could be more easily realized within a network. 
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2.2 Back End 
2.2.1 Regional Fuel Cycle Centre (RFCC) 
This part of the study inv~stigates the model for a multinational fuel 
cycle centre, as fQrmulated for the first time in 1977 in a project report 
from the IAEA on forms of organization for nuclear fuel cycle facilities. 
This model envisages that several states will join tagether on the basis 
of mutually identical interests and requirements for the purpese of planning, 
constructing and operating nuclear facilities associated with the stages 
in the fuel cycle after unloading the fuel elements from the reactor. 
That is to say the storage of spent fuel elements, their reprocessing, 
the fabrication of plutonium-bearing fuel as well as the treatment of 
radioactive waste. This latter comprises the fields of intermediate storage, 
transportation and final storage. Inclusion of the front end in the fuel 
cycle (e.g. enrichment) has not been ruled out, but in the view of the 
IAEA did not have a high priority at that time. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany for statutory licensing reasons the 
extension of nuclear power plants and their operation is subject to the 
proof of availability of back end services. In connection with participation 
in a multinational fuel cycle centre Germany would be imposed on extension 
of the back end in the nuclear fuel cycle under an international treaty. 
Whereas at the moment reprocessing in Germany is incumbent upon private 
operators, inclusion of the Federal Republic in an organization of this 
type would basically result in the transfer of the reprocessing obligation 
to the government. 
Motivation for the formation of a multinational organization for the con-
struction and operation of a fuel cycle centre results from the realization 
that the further proliferation of nuclear weapons can in the long term 
not solely be combatted by international nuclear materials safeguards 
measures. Since proliferation is a political problem, gaps in the non-
proliferation scheme can in first instance be bridged by political measures. 
An internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle has therefore been ex-
tensively discussed in international circles - particularly in the course 
of INFCE. 
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Internationalization comprises arrangements on the governmental level, 
technical support and research programmes, safeguards agreements, supply 
contracts and multinational cooperation agreements. It is presumed that 
a group of nations has a mutual interest and need in securing their energy 
supply by cooperation and in creating a more stable basis for confidence 
so that commercial nuclear technology will not be misused for the construction 
of nuclear weapons. 
The study comes to the conclusion - in an evaluating summary of the in-
dividual legal, political, economic and organizational aspects - that 
neither the creation of a multinational fuel cycle centre nor the creation 
of an international organization for the construction and operation of 
such an industrial complex represent realistic approaches to solving the 
problem. 
The size of a fuel cycle centre raises different acceptance problems for 
the host state since the facility will have tobe designed in such a way 
that all member states could be supplied with back end services. 
With respect to the organizational form, the multinational variant would 
indeed be easier to realize in cantrast to the international organization 
but this would only be desirable in a Urenco/Centec version. In this variant 
of the solution each member state would operate a more or less national 
facility on its own territory. 
Multinational cooperation with nuclear recipient countries would seem 
to be a solution with respect to smaller fuel cycle centres. However, 
this type of solution would rule out successful cooperation from the very 
beginning due to the concomitant problems regarding political dependence. 
The study comes to the conclusion that creation of an International Excess 
Plutonium Storage System is a suitable institutional measure for preventing 
the accumulation of excess fissile material (in this case separated plutonium) 
while at the same time assuring the supply for the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. 
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2.2.2 International Spent Fuel Management (ISFM) 
Internationalization of management as well as of storage of spent fuel 
elements has been extensively discussed as a possibility of applying insti-
* tutional models in INFCE-WG6. In this context it was ascertained that 
the existing legal and institutional framewerk for the storage and trans-
portation of spent fuel elements was sufficient to minimize the risk of 
proliferation. However, it was also ascertained that there is at the moment 
no international legal framewerk which would guarantee the individual coun-
tries access to their spent fuel elements or the storage and transportation 
of these. 
The individual elements of the model have not been discussed internationally 
up to now. Nevertheless, a few boundary conditions were mentioned in the 
INFCE which would be advantageaus for the introduction of such a system, 
such as collocation, non-discrimination, international conciliatioo, safe-
guards, further utilization of spent fuel elements and maintenance of 
the reprocessing option. 
This part of the study depicts internationalization of management and 
storage of spent fuel elements in the way it was discussed as a possibility 
for applying institutional models in INFCE WG6. 
Realization of an international regime is analyzed from the points of 
view of protection against proliferation, assurance of supply, economic 
efficiency, assurance of planning, transfer of technology, political accept-
ance, the aspects of health, safety and environment, and capability to 
sanctions. It becomes apparent that the pessimism already expressed in 
the INFCE with respect to the establishment of international management 
for spent fuel elements is confirmed. 
Present technical boundary conditions suggest the conclusion that in the 
immediate future no international solution for the storage of spent fuel 
elementswill be achieved and that the nations concerned, at least insofar 
as they have a fairly large national nuclear energy programme, will have 
to provide the necessary storage capacity under exclusively national ad-
ministration. 
* In 1979 the Director General of the IAEA convened a group of experts 
to deal with the problems of ISFM and they have not yet completed their work. 
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2.2.3 International Plutonium Storage (IPS) 
In the commercial reactor systems used at the present time, nuclear fuel 
is largely applied in the U-Pu cycle. The plutonium resulting in this fuel 
cycle raises various problems for the further extension of nuclear energy. 
There are basically two possibilities in treating the problern of Pu man-
agement. The plutonium is either left in the spent fuel elements and these 
are brought to a corresponding store, or the spent fuel elements are taken 
to a reprocessing facility. In reprocessing irradiated fuels plutonium is 
separated. It is the primary energy carrier available for refabrication 
into fuel elements with respect to utilization in fast breeders. Basically, 
reprocessing and utilization of plutonium in nuclear reactors appears to 
be indispensable for industrialized countries poor in uranium. This results 
in plutonium management with the possibility of storage. Nevertheless, 
it must be presumed at the moment, an the basis of the delayed introduction 
of nuclear energy programmes in various countries, that reprocessing and 
application of the fastbreederwill also only proceed slowly. Although 
the quantities of separated plutonium are still relatively small at present 
they will increase because of the extension of commercial reproce?sing, 
at least in some countries. The concern of the international community 
is on the one hand to protect plutoniu~ against misuse for constructing 
nuclear explosives. Comprehensive technical, Safeguarding and institutional 
measures should be applied to achieve this aim. On the other hand, confidence 
should be bolstered that fissile material will continue to be available 
as a primary energy carrier so that world economic and social equilibrium 
can be encouraged. 
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In 1976 an internal working group of the Secretariate was commissioned 
by the IAEA and they worked on a comprehensive study of 11 International 
Management and Storage of Plutonium and Spent Fuel 11 until 1978, and in-
vestigated models for improved international cooperation in the management 
of irradiated fuel elements. 
A group of experts from the member countries have been engaged in acquiring 
a better understanding of the questions involved in international plutonium 
storage since 1978. They are to make appropriate suggestions to the IAEA 
Board of Governors, with the ultimate participation of delegations from 
25 nations (Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage (IPS)). 
The problern of reprocessing, plutonium processing and recycling was also 
investigated in the INFCE discussions. According to INFCE data, the quantity 
of stored plutonium in spent fuel present up to the end of 1977 amounted 
to more than 21 tons worldwide (without the so~ialist countries). Accordtng 
to INFCE estimates, this volume amounted to over 43 tons at the end of 
1980 and will reach 57 tons by the end of 1990. 
The study investigates the institutional measures which could prevent the 
accumulation of excess separated plutonium under national administration. 
The motivation in creating an !PS system is to prevent excess plutonium 
from accumulating, particularly separated plutonium, while at the same 
time assuring the supply for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Furthermore, 
in its statute the IAEA is granted the right to demand that excess fissile 
material be deposited. The legal basis for this is Article XII.A.S, IAEA 
statute: 
The fissile material is accordingly divided into two categories: 
The material in use and the material which exceeds the quantities 
required for the envisaged applications. 
Application refers to the final use of the fissile material. 
The third essential aspect is the IAEA's obligation toreturn the 
fissile material to the member state promptly on demand. 
A problern is to be found in categorizing all the separated plutonium according 
to the material in use and excess material. In this question, the study 
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favours the principle that each member state should be granted the right 
to categorize the material and thus to determine excesses. 
The study suggests that, for the institutional implementation of an IPS 
system, that safeguards agreements between the IAEA and IPS member states 
should be made a prerequisite which will be supplemented by an IPS arrangement. 
Furthermore, nations with an IPS store shall conclude a hast agreement with 
the IAEA. Membership in the IPS system would have to be open to all nations 
as well as to those international organizations who are responsible with 
respect to nuclear energy. 
The arrangement on implementing the IPS system would have to regulate 
the following points which are dealt with in detail in the study: 
Registration of the separated plutonium. 
Registration of the separated plutonium would have to be accompanied 
by a use declaration in the initial phase of the IPS system so that 
it wo~ld be possible to differentiate between excess material and 
materjal in use for the safeguards authorities. Accordingly the 
use declaration would have to be surrendered as part of the return 
process. 
Depositing excess plutonium. 
In implementing the IPS system, the IAEA should require a deposit, 
for example in the sense that the member state be obliged always to 
deposit its plutonium in excess of the quantities required for the 
named applications in an IPS store immediately. This requirement 
refers to the quantity of separated plutonium for which no use declaration 
can be given. 
Release procedure. 
Application for release should contain the following data: 
Specification of the IPS store from which the separated plutonium 
is to be taken; 
desired quantity of plutonium; 
required release date: 
Specification of the facility for which the material is finally 
determined. The IAEA shall examine whether the application 
is complete in this sense and authorize return within one 
month. 
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Verification of plutonium use. 
The IAEA shall verify plutonium use as part of its safeguards ac-
tivities. 
Changes in plutonium use. 
The IAEA shall be informed in advance of changes in the planned 
use of plutonium and shall transfer its consent to return to the 
new application. Resterage of the plutoniumwill become necessary 
if no use declaration can be given for the plutonium. 
Designation of IPS stores. 
IPS stores should be located directly at a reprocessing facility 
or MOX fuel element factory. INFCIRC/225 should be implemented with 
respect to physical protection. IPS stores should not be filled 
to capacity in case an IPS store has to be cleared for some reason 
or another. Renewal or the authority to clear an IPS store should 
be incumbent upon the IAEA's Board of Governors. 
Distribution of responsibilities. 
The IAEA shall be responsible for safeguards and custody (permanent 
presence of inspectors). The host country could be owner and operator. 
The principles of free nuclear trade would have to be valid. Insofar 
as foreign material is stored, import and export of the plutonium 
and also operation of the IPS store must not be impeded. In a crisis 
the IAEA would have to have the possibility of transferring the 
contents of the store. 
The study indicates that an IPS commission is neither necessary 
nor desirable. 
An IPS system conceived in this way would fulfill the principles of non-
proliferation within the safeguards framewerk and would increase assurance 
of supply. 
Prior consent rights as well as other bilateral reservations which impinge 
upon the spheres of national sovereignty, economic efficiency and planning 
could either be dispensed with or their effect could at least be better 
adjusted to the necessities of supply assurance. 
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3. Conclusion 
With increased utilization of nucl~ar energy worldwide institutional mecha-
nisms could be applied which would serve both non-proliferation and assurance 
of supply. Participation in a multinational fuel cycle centre would indeed 
have advantages at the front and back end for states with fairly small 
nuclear programmes. However, legal, political and organizational aspects 
make the realization of models of this type seem unrealistic. An international 
storage system for excess separated plutonium would have advantages, both 
with respect to non-proliferation and also assurance of supply, if for 
this model certain reservations could be suspended or their effects con-
siderably reduced, for example by determining suitable conditions. A store 
for spent fuel elements would similarly provide advantages in supply assurance 
for countries with fairly small nuclear programmes. In case of interruptions 
in supply at the front end of the fuel cycle two emergency mechanisms 
are suggested. On the one hand a fuel bank, which seems to be more suitable 
for small consumers, as well as a uranium safety net, which could be ad-
vantageous for large-scale consumers and is characterized by great flex-
ibility. 
-17-
4. References 
Th. Conolly, U. Hansen, W. Jaek, K.-H. Beckurts, World Nuclear Energy 
Paths, London, New York, 1979 
R. Dolzer, M. Hilf, E. Münch, B. Richter, G. Stein, Institutionelle 
Aspekte des nuklearen Brennstoffkreislaufs 
Jül-Spez-69, January, 1980 
Frederick F. McGoldrick, International Plutonium Storage, Lecture 
held at the ANS International Conference on Non-Proliferation and 
Safeguards, 
Mexico City, 7- 10 Sept., 1980 
International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) Assurances of 
Long-Term Supply Technology, Fuel and Heavy Water and Services in 
the Interest of National Needs Consistent with Non-Proliferation, 
Report of Warking Group 3 
IAEA, Vienna, 1980 
International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) Spent Fuel Man-
agement, Report of Working_Group 6, 
IAEA, Vienna, 1980 
Katherine H. Larson, International Plutonium Storage: The Establishment 
of a Scheme within the International Atomic Energy Agency, Lecture 
held at the Conference an New Forms pf International Nuclear Cooperation, 
Bellagio, 28 - 31 March, 1980 
Russel W. Fox and Mason Willrich, International Custody of Plutonium 
Stocks: A First Step Toward an International Regime for Sensitive 
Nuclear Activities, 
ICGNE, Nov., 1978 
Prior Consent and Security of Supply in International Nuclear Trade, 
Uranium Institute, 
London, Oct., 1980 
